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Abstract
We build a micro-founded two-country dynamic general equilibrium model in which trade responds
more to a cut in tari¤s in the long run than in the short run. The model introduces a time element
to the xed-variable cost trade-o¤ in a heterogeneous producer trade model. Thus, the dynamics
of aggregate trade adjustment arise from producer-level decisions to invest in lowering their future
variable export costs. The model is calibrated to match salient features of new exporter growth
and provides a new estimate of the exporting technology. At the micro level, we nd that new
exporters commonly incur substantial losses in the 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export prots are backloaded. At the macro level, the slow export expansion at the producer level
leads to sluggishness in the aggregate response of exports to a change in tari¤s, with a long-run
trade elasticity that is 2.9 times the short-run trade elasticity. We estimate the welfare gains from
trade from a cut in tari¤s, taking into account the transition period. While the intensity of trade
expands slowly, consumption overshoots its new steady-state level, so the welfare gains are almost
15 times larger than the long-run change in consumption. Models without this dynamic export
decision underestimate the gains to lowering tari¤s, particularly when constrained to also match
the gradual expansion of aggregate trade ows.
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1 Introduction
A robust feature of international trade is that it takes time for trade volumes to fully adjust
to changes in trade barriers or relative prices: The trade elasticity, which measures the
change in the share of trade in overall expenditures relative to the change in tari¤s, increases
with the time horizon considered.1 Despite widespread agreement that the trade elasticity
increases over time, recent theoretical work evaluating the gains from trade largely ignores
the e¤ect of this transition on welfare. A rationale for ignoring transitions is that steady-
state analyses provide an upper bound on the gains from trade since there is less trade along
the transition.2 In this paper, we show that this rationale is wrong. Slow trade growth along
the transition can lead to larger, not smaller, welfare gains.
We develop the idea that transitions are important for welfare in a micro-founded model
in which slow trade growth at the producer level gives rise to slow trade growth at the
aggregate level. Our model nests the now-standard models of heterogeneous producers faced
with xed costs of exporting (Krugman 1980, Melitz 2003, Das, Roberts, and Tybout 2007).
These models emphasize the trade-o¤between xed and variable export costs. Heterogeneity
in productivity leads producers to sort into exporters and non-exporters. The discrete nature
of the export entry decision in these models, however, generates producer-level dynamics that
are at odds with the data. In the data, new exporters initially export a small share of their
sales, which then grows slowly with the producers tenure in the export market (see Figure
1A). In the discrete choice models, when a producer enters the export market, its share of
sales that is exported jumps immediately to its long-run value.
A novel feature of our model is that it generalizes the producers export technology to
include a time dimension in the xed versus variable cost trade-o¤. As in the standard
models, non-exporters can pay a xed cost to become an exporter, and existing exporters
1A large empirical literature identies di¤erent short-run and long-run trade responses to aggregate shocks
(Hooper, Johnson, and Marquez 2000, Gallaway, McDaniel, and Rivera 2003). Many theoretical studies of
the role of trade adjustment explicitly or implicitly calibrate the trade elasticity di¤erently based on the
horizon considered, (Obstfeld and Rogo¤ 2005). Some recent theoretical work has endogenized the dynamics
of the trade elasticity, including Alessandria and Choi (2007), Drozd and Nosal (2012), Engel and Wang
(2011), Ramanarayanan (2007), Ruhl (2008), and Alessandria, Pratap, and Yue (2013).
2Baldwin (1992) shows that the dynamic" gains from the increased capital accumulation in response to
a cut in tari¤s are o¤set by the forgone consumption necessary to support the extra capital stock, unless
capital is subject to external economies of scale.
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must pay a xed cost to continue exporting. In contrast to the ndings of the existing
literature, a producers capacity for exporting evolves dynamically. As long as exporters
remain in the foreign market, the marginal cost of exporting stochastically improves over
time: It takes time, resources, and a bit of luck to become an e¢ cient exporter. As producers
become more e¢ cient exporters, their export volumes grow, generating the slow expansion
of trade at the producer level that we observe in the data.
In the model, the behavior of trade in the aggregate is determined by the behavior of
producers: There is no aggregate technology. By disciplining our model of producer-level
exporting technology with producer-level data, we avoid making any assumptions about how
aggregate trade behaves. In particular, we are not forced to try estimating a trade elasticity
that will govern the aggregate behavior of trade a di¢ cult undertaking given that the trade
elasticity is not constant.
In our calibrated model, which generates realistic producer-level export transitions and
growth, we study the welfare implications of trade liberalization. The existing literature
has largely ignored transitions when computing the welfare gains from trade. The models
considered in Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) or Burstein and Melitz (2011),
for example, do not have meaningful trade transitions: The models are either static or they
jump instantaneously from one steady state to the next.3 Our model, which generates
a time-varying trade elasticity, demonstrates not only that transitions are important for
welfare, but that they also are benecial. The transition following trade liberalization is a
time of increased consumption. The gain in welfare including the transition period from
a ten-percent cut in tari¤s is more than 15 times larger than the steady-state increase in
consumption in our benchmark model.
The producer-level dynamics in the transition period following a cut in tari¤s generate
two competing forces. First, because trade adjusts slowly, producers must make investments
in export-specic capacity that will yield increases in exports and prots only in the future.
This force reduces the resources available for production and consumption in the short run,
3Existing models that do generate nontrivial transitions in trade, such as Alessandria and Choi (2007),
Engel and Wang (2011), and Drozd and Nosal (2012), have focused on the business cycle properties of
the models and have ignored the welfare implications. Alessandria and Choi (2011) do consider transition
dynamics in a model without new exporter dynamics.
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while improving the e¢ ciency of the economy in the long run. Once tari¤s are reduced,
the economy has too little export capacity, and the investments that must be made in the
transition period act to reduce welfare.
The second force, which gives rise to overshooting in consumption, is a desire to cut back
on investments in new varieties. In our framework, varieties are long-lived assets resulting
from sunk investments made to create the establishment. When tari¤s are reduced, the
increased range of varieties from abroad decreases the incentive to invest in accumulating
domestic varieties. The desire to run down the stock of domestic varieties frees up resources
for production and consumption along the transition, increasing welfare. In the long run,
though, the reduced investments in establishments reduce the scale of production, explaining
why the change in steady-state consumption is relatively small even though trade grows
substantially.
These two forces generate a nonlinear relationship between the trade share and con-
sumption along the transition to the new steady-state following a trade liberalization. In
our calibrated model, the consumption gain from running down the overaccumulated stock
of varieties is more important than the increased investment in export capacity. Thus, con-
sumption overshoots its steady-state level, and the welfare gains from trade are larger when
the transition is taken into account.
We show in Section 6 that producer-level heterogeneity is crucial to understanding the
gains from trade and the aggregate trade dynamics from trade liberalization. We do so by
constructing a version of our model in which there is no cost to enter the export market, so
all producers export, as in Krugman (1980). To keep the aggregate trade dynamics identical
across versions of the model, we introduce an adjustment friction and recalibrate the model.
While the aggregate trade dynamics in the baseline model and this version of the model
are identical, the consumption dynamics are very di¤erent. In the model without meaning-
ful producer heterogeneity, consumption grows smoothly during the transition, rather than
overshooting as in the baseline model. In this version of the model, the welfare gain is
smaller than in the baseline model, even though the steady-state increase in consumption is
larger. The results from these experiments imply that the relationship between aggregate
trade volumes and consumption and, thus, welfare is much more complicated in dynamic
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models than in their static counterparts.
We also show that heterogeneity in export intensity arising from new-exporter dynamics
matters for our quantitative results. Eliminating new-exporter growth from our benchmark
model reduces it to a GE version of the well-known sunk-cost-of-exporting model developed
by Dixit (1989), Baldwin and Krugman (1989), and Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007). Con-
sistent with Alessandria and Choi (2011), our version of the sunk-cost model also generates
overshooting of consumption and a welfare gain that is larger than the change in steady-
state consumption. However, the benchmark model with new-exporter dynamics generates
a welfare gain that is one-third larger than that of the sunk-cost model, even though the
long-run change in consumption in the benchmark model is only one-fth that of the sunk-
cost model. The larger welfare gains in the benchmark model arise because, in the transition
period, consumption overshoots by more, with a peak gap of almost ve percentage points.
The bigger boom in consumption occurs even though trade grows much more gradually in
the benchmark model than in the sunk-cost model and is, in large part, attributed to a
greater desire to run down the stock of new establishments. Thus, we nd a larger role for
exporter dynamics than in previous work.
In addition to our ndings on transitions and welfare, we provide a new estimate of the
technology for exporting. We follow the literature in splitting xed export costs into a sunk
entry cost and a continuation cost. Consistent with Ruhl and Willis (2008), we nd that with
a reasonable exporter lifecycle, the estimated sunk entry cost of exporting is much smaller
than those derived from discrete-choice models that ignore new-exporter dynamics. Pushing
the returns from exporting into the future reduces the present value of starting to export,
so smaller entry costs are needed to match the observed levels of export participation. In
contrast to much of the literature, we nd that the costs of starting to export are about as
large as the costs of continuing to export. This large di¤erence from the literature arises
because the continuation cost in our model has an investment component since paying it
could further reduce an exporters future variable cost and increase its future export prots.
Indeed, in our model, we nd that a new exporter will, on average, earn negative prots in
the rst few years after starting to export. The losses in these early years arise from the
continuation costs being high relative to gross prots from exporting.
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In Section 2, we review the data on the exporter lifecycle, laying out key producer-
level facts used to discipline our model of the producers exporting technology. In Section
3, we lay out the model, and in Section 4, we describe our strategy for calibrating the
model. In Section 5, we report the results from the baseline model and show how the gains
from trade liberalization are much larger than the steady-state to steady-state comparisons
would suggest. In Section 6, we present alternative versions of the model, highlighting the
importance of producer heterogeneity in understanding the welfare gains from trade. The
online appendix includes analytical results showing how the steady-state changes with tari¤s
and iceberg cost.
2 New-Exporter Dynamics
At the center of our model is a novel generalization of the specication of the producers
exporting technology. This generalization allows us to capture key facts about exporters
that the existing literature has typically ignored. Before laying out the model, we briey
review the data describing the exporter lifecycle that motivate, and, ultimately, will be used
to calibrate, our specication of the exporting technology.
New exporters begin by exporting small amounts and increase their exporting activity
over several years. Figure 1A, from Ruhl and Willis (2008), plots the average export-total
sales ratio of new exporters in Colombia. The average continuing exporter ships 13 percent
of its output abroad, while a new exporter ships about six percent of total sales abroad in
its rst year. It takes ve years for the new exporter to reach the same export intensity as
the existing exporters. Similar patterns of new exporter behavior are documented in Rho
and Rodrigue (2013) and Eaton, Eslava, Krizan, Kugler, and Tybout (2009).
A second important aspect of export entry is evident in Figure 1B, also from Ruhl and
Willis (2008). In this gure, we plot the one-period survival rate of exporters conditional on
their time in the export market. An export entrant has a 65-percent chance of continuing
to export, and this survival rate increases with the time spent as an exporter. The slowly
expanding export ows and the high rates of exit imply that export entry is a decision that
likely pays o¤ only in the long run if at all.
4
3 Model
We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model that captures the lifecycle of both es-
tablishments and exporters. There are two symmetric countries: home and foreign. Each
country is populated by a unit mass of identical, innitely-lived consumers that inelastically
supply one unit of labor.
In each country, competitive nal goods producers purchase home and foreign, fH;Fg,
di¤erentiated intermediate inputs. The nal good is not traded and is used for consumption,
investment,4 and as an input into production. There exists a one-period nominal bond
denominated in units of the home nal good. Let Bt denote the home consumers holding
of bonds purchased in period t. Let Bt denote the foreign consumers holding of this bond.
The bond pays one unit of home currency in period t+ 1. Let Qt denote the nominal price
of the bond Bt. The home nal good is the numeraire, so that its price, Pt = 1: We focus
on a symmetric economy with symmetric policies, and, thus, the foreign price level, P t = 1,
and Bt = 0:
Intermediate goods producers in each country are characterized by their productivity,
xed export cost, and iceberg trade cost. Productivity is stochastic. Iceberg costs have
an endogenous and stochastic element, while the xed cost is endogenous. The shocks
to productivity and iceberg costs generate movements of establishments into and out of
exporting. Unproductive establishments exit and new establishments enter.
All intermediate goods producers sell to their own country, but only some export. Ex-
porting requires paying a xed and variable costs. All exporters face the same ad valorem
tari¤,  ; but di¤er in their iceberg transportation cost,   1; and xed export costs. The
tari¤ is a policy variable, and the revenues collected from the tari¤ are rebated lump-sum
to the household. The transportation cost is a feature of technology. Fraction    1 of an
export shipment is destroyed in transit. Fixed export costs are paid in units of domestic
labor.
To make the problemmost tractable, there are three possible iceberg costs  2 fL; H ;1g
4Capital accumulation is included to more accurately quantify the gains from trade. In most models,
capital accumulation tends to increase the steady-state gain from a cut in trade barriers, but makes the
steady-state change overstate the welfare gain. Hence, the results are even more surprising.
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with L  H <1 and two possible xed export costs f 2 ffL; fHg ; fL  fH . Fixed export
costs are related to the variable iceberg costs. Producers with an iceberg cost of  = 1
are non-exporters. A non-exporter can lower its next-period iceberg cost to H by paying a
cost fH . An exporter with iceberg costs t = fL; Hg can incur a cost fL to draw its next-
period iceberg cost. We assume that the transition probabilities are Markovian and that the
probability of drawing the low iceberg costs, L; is lower for an exporter with a high iceberg
cost than a producer with a low iceberg cost (i.e.,  (LjH)   (LjL)). Thus, part of
exporting is making an investment that may lead to a lower marginal cost of exporting in
the future. If an exporter does not pay fL, its next period iceberg cost rises to  =1.
This formulation of xed and iceberg costs is quite general and nests the most common
approaches to modeling trade. When fL < fH , there is a sunk cost of exporting, as in Das,
Roberts, and Tybout (2007). When fL = fH and L = H ; exporting is a static decision.
When fL = fH = 0 and L = H ; there is no export decision, and this is a general version of
the Krugman (1980) model of monopolistic competition.
A potential establishment enters by hiring fE domestic workers and begins producing in
the following period. The measure of country j 2 fH;Fg establishments with technology
z; iceberg costs , and xed costs f is 'j;t (z; ; f).
5 Exit is exogenous and depends on
the current productivity level.6 The state variable of the economy includes the measure of
establishments across individual state variables from each country and the capital stock in
each country. For notational ease, economy-wide state variables are subsumed in the time
subscript.
5Here, f is the xed cost that the producer has to pay if it decides to export, f = fH if  = 1 and
f = fL otherwise. Note that the producer-specic state is given by (z; ). However, we describe producers
with (z; ; f) to explicitly denote the xed cost that producers face.
6Introducing endogenous exit from a xed production cost is straightforward and yields similar results to
our benchmark model.
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3.1 Consumers
Home consumers choose consumption, investment, and bonds to maximize utility subject to
the sequence of budget constraints,
VC;0 = max
1X
t=0
tU (Ct) ;
Ct +Kt +QtBt  WtLt +RtKt 1 + (1  )Kt 1 +Bt 1 + t + Tt;(1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the subjective time discount factor; Ct is nal consumption; Kt 1 is the
capital available in period t;Wt andRt denote the real wage rate and the rental rate of capital;
 is the depreciation rate of capital; t is real dividends from home producers; and Tt is the
real lump-sum transfer of local tari¤ revenue. Investment is dened as It = Kt (1  )Kt 1:
The foreign consumers problem is analogous. Foreign prices and allocations are denoted
with an asterisk. The foreign budget constraint is
(2) Ct +K

t +QtB

t  W t Lt +RtKt 1 + (1  )Kt 1 +Bt 1 + t + T t ;
where all prices are quoted in units of the home nal good.
The rst-order conditions for the consumersutility maximization problems are
Qt = 
UC;t+1
UC;t
= 
UC;t+1
UC;t+1
;(3)
1 = 
UC;t+1
UC;t
(Rt+1 + 1  ) = 
UC;t+1
UC;t
 
Rt+1 + 1  

;(4)
where UC;t denotes the derivative of the utility function with respect to its argument.
3.2 Final Goods Producers
Final goods are produced by combining home and foreign intermediate goods. The aggrega-
tion technology is a CES function
(5) Dt =
8<: X
j2fH;Fg
X
2fL;H ;1g
Z
z
ydj;t (z; ; f)
 1
 'j;t (z; ; f) dz
9=;

 1
;
where ydj;t (z; ; f) are inputs of intermediate goods purchased from country j intermediate
producers. The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods is  > 1.
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The nal goods market is competitive. Given the price of inputs, the nal goods producer
chooses purchases of intermediate inputs, ydj;t, to solve
max F;t = Dt  
X
2fL;H ;1g
Z
z
PH;t (z; ; f) y
d
H;t (z; ; f)'H;t (z; ; f) dz(6)
  (1 + )
X
2fL;Hg
Z
z
PF;t (z; ; f) y
d
F;t (z; ; f)'F;t (z; ; f) dz;
subject to the production technology (5). Here, Pj;t (z; ; f) are the home-country prices of
intermediate goods produced in country j establishments. Solving the problem in (6) yields
the input demand functions,
ydH;t (z; ; f) = [PH;t (z; ; f)]
 Dt;(7)
ydF;t (z; ; f) = [(1 + )PF;t (z; ; f)]
 Dt;(8)
where the nal goods price is dened as
Pt =
8<: X
2fL;H ;1g
Z
z
h
PH;t (z; ; f)
1  'H;t (z; ; f) + [(1 + )PF;t (z; ; f)]
1 'F;t (z; ; f)
i
dz
9=;
1
1 
:
3.3 Intermediate Goods Producers
An intermediate goods producer is described by its technology, iceberg cost, and xed cost,
(z; ; f). It produces using capital k, labor l, and materials x according to a Cobb-Douglas
production technology,
(9) yt (z; ; f) = ez

kt (z; ; f)
 lt (z; ; f)
1 1 x x (z; ; f)x :
The markets that the producer serves in the current period are predetermined, so the pro-
ducer maximizes current-period gross prots by choosing prices for each market, PH;t (z; ; f)
and P H;t (z; ; f), labor lt (z; ; f), capital kt (z; ; f), and materials xt (z; ; f) ; to solve
t (z; ; f) = maxPH;t (z; ; f) yH;t (z; ; f) + P

H;t (z; ; f) y

H;t (z; ; f)(10)
 Wtlt (z; ; f) Rtkt (z; ; f)  Ptxt (z; ; f) ;
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subject to the production technology (9), a constraint that supplies to home and foreign
goods markets, yH;t (z; ; f) and yH;t (z; ; f), are feasible
(11) yt (z; ; f) = yH;t (z; ; f) + yH;t (z; ; f) ;
and the constraints that supplies to home and foreign goods markets are equal to the demands
from nal good producers from (7) and its foreign analogue,
yH;t (z; ; f) = y
d
H;t (z; ; f) ;(12)
yH;t (z; ; f) = y
d
H;t (z; ; f) :(13)
Given its downward-sloping demand curve, the monopolistic producer charges a constant
markup over marginal cost in each market,
PH;t (z; ; f) =

   1MCte
 z(14)
P H;t (z; ; f) =

   1MCte
 z;(15)
where
(16) MCt =  xx (1  x) (1 x)
"
Rt


Wt
1  
1 #1 x
:
Note that when  =1, the producer is a non-exporter.
The value of the producer with (z; ), if it decides to export in period t+ 1, is
(17) V 1t (z; ; f) =  Wtf + ns (z)Qt
X
02fL;Hg
Z
z0
Vt+1 (z
0; 0; fL) (z0jz)  (0j) dz0;
and the value of the producer, if it does not export in period t+ 1, is
(18) V 0t (z; ; f) = ns (z)Qt
Z
z0
Vt+1 (z
0;1; fH) (z0jz) dz0;
where ns(z) is the probability that the producer survives until the next period. Note that
this probability varies with the producers productivity. The value of the producer is
(19) Vt (z; ; f) = t (z; ; f) + max

V 1t (z; ; f) ; V
0
t (z; ; f)
	
:
Clearly, the value of a producer depends on its xed cost, iceberg cost, and productivity.
Given that there are three possible levels of iceberg costs, there are now three possible cuto¤s,
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zm;t; with m 2 fL;H;1g : The critical level of technology for exporting, zm;t; satises
(20) V 1t (zm;t; m; f) = V
0
t (zm;t; m; f) :
It is straightforward to show that the threshold for exporting is largest for non-exporters
and smallest for exporters with the low iceberg cost (z1;t > zH;t  zL;t):
3.4 Entry
New establishments are created by hiring fE workers in the period prior to production.
Entrants draw their productivity from the distribution E (z
0). Entrants cannot export in
their rst productive period. The free-entry condition is
(21) V Et =  WtfE +Qt
Z
z0
Vt+1 (z
0;1; fH)E (z0) dz0  0:
The mass of entrants in period t is NE;t, while the mass of incumbents, Nt, is made up
of the two types of exporters and the non-exporters,
NL;t =
Z
z
'H;t (z; L; fL) dz;(22)
NH;t =
Z
z
'H;t (z; H ; fL) dz;(23)
N1;t =
Z
z
'H;t (z;1; fH) dz:(24)
The mass of exporters equals N1;t = NL;t + NH;t; the mass of non-exporters equals
N0;t = N1;t; and the mass of establishments equals Nt = N1;t + N0;t: The xed costs of
exporting imply that only a fraction, nx;t = N1;t=Nt, of home intermediates are available in
the foreign country in period t:
Given the critical level of technology for exporters and non-exporters, zm;t; the starter
ratio, the fraction of establishments among non-exporters that start exporting, and the
stopper ratio, the fraction of exporters among surviving establishments who stop exporting,
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are, respectively,
n0;t+1 =
R1
z1;t ns (z)'H;t (z;1; fH) dzR
z
ns (z)'H;t (z;1; fH) dz
; and(25)
n1;t+1 =
P
m2fL;Hg
R zm;t
 1 ns (z)'H;t (z; m; fL) dzP
m2fL;Hg
R
z
ns (z)'H;t (z; m; fL) dz
:(26)
The mass of establishments evolves according to
't+1 (z
0;1; fH) =
X
m2fL;H;1g
Z zm;t
 1
ns (z)'H;t (z; m; f) (z
0jz) dz +NE;tE (z0) ;(27)
't+1 (z
0; H ; fL) =
X
m2fL;H;1g
 (H jm)
Z 1
zm;t
ns (z)'H;t (z; m; f) (z
0jz) dz;(28)
't+1 (z
0; L; fL) =
X
m2fL;H;1g
 (Ljm)
Z 1
zm;t
ns (z)'H;t (z; m; f) (z
0jz) dz:(29)
3.5 Government and Aggregate Variables
The government collects tari¤s and redistributes the revenue lump sum to domestic con-
sumers. The governments budget constraint is
(30) Tt = 
X
2fL;Hg
Z
z
PF;t (z; ; fL) yF;t (z; ; fL)'F;t (z; ; fL) dz:
Nominal exports and imports are dened as
EXNt =
X
2fL;Hg
Z
z
P H;t (z; ; fL) y

H;t (z; ; fL)'H;t (z; ; fL) dz; and(31)
IMNt =
X
2fL;Hg
Z
z
PF;t (z; ; fL) yF;t (z; ; fL)'F;t (z; ; fL) dz;(32)
respectively. Home nominal GDP is the sum of value added from intermediate and nal
goods producers, which equals Y Nt = Ct + It + EX
N
t   IMNt : The trade-to-GDP ratio is
TRt =
EXNt +IM
N
t
2Y Nt
: Let IMDt be the expenditure on imported goods relative to that on home
goods:
(33) IMDt =
(1 +  t)
P
2fL;Hg
R
z
PF;t (z; ; fL) yF;t (z; ; fL)'F;t (z; ; fL) dzP
2fL;H ;1g
R
z
PH;t (z; ; f) yH;t (z; ; f)'H;t (z; ; f) dz
:
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We dene the share of expenditures on domestic goods as
(34) t =
1
1 + IMDt
;
and the trade elasticity as
(35) "t =   ln (IMDt=IMD 1)
ln ((1 +  t) = (1 +  1))
:
Production labor, LP;t; equals
(36) LP;t =
X
2fL;H ;1g
Z
z
lt (z; ; f)'H;t (z; ; f) dz:
The domestic labor hired by exporters to cover the xed costs of exporting, LX;t; equals
(37) LX;t =
X
m2fL;Hg
fL
Z 1
zm;t
'H;t (z; m; fL) dz + fH
Z 1
z1;t
'H;t (z;1; fH) dz:
From (37), we see that the trade cost, measured in units of domestic labor, depends on the
exporter status from the previous period. Aggregate prots equal the di¤erence between
prots and xed costs,
(38) t =
X
2fL;H ;1g
Z
z
t(z; ; f)'H;t (z; ; f) dz  WtLX;t  WtfENE;t:
3.6 Equilibrium Denition
In an equilibrium, variables satisfy several resource constraints. The nal goods market-
clearing conditions are Dt = Ct + It + Xt; and Dt = C

t + I

t + X

t ; where Xt is the total
material inputs in production given by
(39) Xt =
X
2fL;H ;1g
Z
z
xt(z; ; f)'H;t (z; ; f) dz:
Each individual goods market clears; the labor market-clearing conditions are L = LP;t +
LX;t + fENE;t and the foreign analogue; the capital market-clearing conditions are
(40) Kt 1 =
X
2fL;H ;1g
Z
z
kt (z; ; f)'H;t (z; ; f) dz;
and the foreign analogue. The government budget constraint is given by (30) and the foreign
analogue. The prots of establishments are distributed to the shareholders, t, and the
foreign analogue. The international bond market-clearing condition is given by Bt +Bt = 0.
Finally, writing the budget constraints in units of local currency permits us to normalize the
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price of consumption in each country as Pt = P t = 1.
An equilibrium of the economy is a collection of allocations for home consumers Ct; Bt,
and Kt; allocations for foreign consumers Ct ; B

t ; and K

t ; allocations for home nal goods
producers; allocations for foreign nal goods producers; allocations, prices, and export deci-
sions for home intermediate producers; allocations, prices, and export decisions for foreign
intermediate producers; labor used for exporting costs and for entry costs by home and
foreign producers; transfers Tt; T t by home and foreign governments; real wages Wt, W

t ,
real rental rates of capital Rt; Rt , and bond prices Qt that satisfy the following conditions:
(i) the consumer allocations solve the consumers problem; (ii) the nal good producers
allocations solve their prot-maximization problems; (iii) intermediated good producersal-
locations, prices, and export decisions solve their prot-maximization problems; (iv) the
entry conditions holds; (v) the market-clearing conditions hold; and (vi) the transfers satisfy
the government budget constraint.
4 Calibration
The model is calibrated to match features of the US economy. We rst describe the functional
forms and parameter values of our benchmark economy. The parameter values used in the
simulation exercises are reported in Table 1.
The instantaneous utility function is U(C) = C
1 
1  ; where 1= is the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution. The discount factor, ; depreciation rate, ; and risk aversion, ; are
standard,  = 0:96;  = 0:10; and  = 2 . Labor supply is normalized to 1.
The distribution of establishments is determined by the structure of shocks. To elimi-
nate the role of the elasticity of substitution  in establishment dispersion, we assume that
producer productivity z = 1
 1 ln a. An incumbents productivity has an autoregressive
component ( < 1) of ln a0 =  ln a + "; " iid N(0; 2"): With an AR(1) shock process, the
conditional distribution is normal,  (ln a0j ln a) = N ( ln a; 2") ; and the unconditional dis-
tribution is N

0; 
2
"
1 2

. Entrants draw productivity based on the unconditional distribution
ln a0 = E + "E; "E
iid N

0; 
2
"
1 2

; where E < 0 is chosen to match the observation that
entrants are smaller than incumbents. Establishments receive an exogenous death shock that
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depends on an establishments last-period productivity, a; so that the probability of death
is nd (a) = 1  ns (a) = max

0;min

e a + nd0; 1
		
:
The parameter  determines both the producers markup and the elasticity of substitution
across varieties. We set  = 5 to yield a producer markup of 25 percent. We set the tari¤
rate to ten percent to include the direct measure of tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers.
Recall that four parameters determine the dynamics of export intensity: the two iceberg
costs fH ; Lg and the transition probabilities, which we denote fLL; HHg. For simplicity,
we assume that LL = HH = ; so that three parameters determine the trade intensity
dynamics.
The labor share parameter in production, ; is set to match the labor income to GDP
ratio of 66 percent. In the model, x determines the ratio of value-added to gross output in
manufacturing. In the United States, this ratio averaged 2.8 from 1987 to 1992 and implies
that x = 0:810. The entry cost, fE, is set to normalize the total mass of establishments,
N , to 1. The mean establishment size is normalized to the US in 1992.
The ten parameters,

; nd; z; 
2
z; E; fL; fH ; L; H ; 
	
; are chosen to match the follow-
ing observations:
1. Export intensity of 13.3 percent (based on the 1992 U.S. Census of Manufactures, CM).
2. Initial export intensity that is half of the mean export intensity (Ruhl and Willis 2008).
3. Export intensity in year ve is twice the export intensity in initial year (Ruhl and
Willis 2008).
4. An exporter rate of 22:3 percent (1992 CM).
5. A stopper rate of 17 percent as in Bernard and Jensen (1999), based on the Annual
Survey of Manufactures (ASM) of the Bureau of the Census, 1984-1992.
6. Five-year exit rate for entrants of 37 percent (Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson 1989).
7. Entrantslabor share of 1:5 percent reported in Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1998),
based on the ASM.
8. Shut-down establishmentslabor share of 2:3 percent (Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh
1998).
9. Establishment employment size distribution as in the 1992 CM.
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Table 1: Model Parameters
Common parameters
   
0.96 2.0 0.10 0.10
Model-specic parameters
Benchmark Sunk-Cost No-Cost
 5.00 5.00 12.54
 0.132 0.132 0.276
m 0.810 0.810 0.704
 21.04 21.04 21.04
nd0 0.0226 0.0226 0.0226
z 0.654 0.654 0.654
" 1.32 1.32 1.32
E -1.34 -1.34 -1.34
fE 32:7 33:2 34:7
fH=fE 0.0376 0.0579 0.000
fL=fE 0.0269 0.0152 0.000
H 1.718 1.430 1.112
L 1.07 1.430 1.112
 0.916 1.000 1.000
The rst three targets summarize the dynamics of export intensity and determine the
technology for shipping (L; H ). The next two targets relate exporters to the population
of establishments and largely determine the xed costs, (fL; fH). The next three targets
help pin down the establishment creation, destruction, and growth process (z; "; ; E; nd).
Newborn establishments and dying establishments tend to have few employees. Moreover,
newborns have high failure rates. Finally, we minimize the distance between the model and
empirical distribution of US establishments.
The calibration provides an estimate of the establishment creation and exporting tech-
nologies. The cost of starting to export is relatively small, only 3.7 percent of the cost of
creating an establishment, but it is about 40-percent larger than the cost of continuing to
export (0.246 vs 0.176). The high iceberg cost H is estimated to be about 63-percent larger
than the low cost L (1.718 vs 1.084), and the idiosyncratic iceberg cost is quite persistent,
 = 0:916:
Figure 2A shows how the average export intensity, measured as the ratio of export revenue
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to total revenue, rises with years of exporting based on our ergodic distribution. It shows that
export intensity grows gradually beyond the ve-year period being targeted. This reects a
rising probability that a long-term exporter has the low iceberg cost. Figure 2B shows that
the probability of continuing in the export market rises over time after the second year in the
market, consistent with the Colombian data in Figure 1B. This primarily reects the fact
that older exporters are more likely to have become e¢ cient exporters and are less willing
to give this up by exiting. This model outcome was not targeted and provides independent
validation of the model. These two gures are consistent with evidence from Ruhl and Willis
(2008).
The low export intensity and continuation probabilities suggest that export prots are
quite low initially and rise over time. Panel C shows how the net prots of a marginal starter
(i.e., a producer with productivity z1 in period 0) evolve over time when it is hit by shocks
that lead it to continue exporting (
Qt
j=1 t > 0). In this gure, we plot
(41) t = 100 
E (t   ftjj > 0; j = 1; ::; t)
f0
:
In the year prior to exporting, 0 =  100 since the producer pays fH and earns 0 = 0. This
measure of net prots to entry costs is rising with time in the market, primarily because
older exporters tend to be more-e¢ cient exporters. Given this prole of gross prots, a new
marginal exporter expects to have negative net prots over its rst three years in the market,
in addition to the loss incurred in the year prior to entry. Over this period, the new exporter
is willing to lose money in order to have the chance to become an e¢ cient exporter in the
future. This investment is risky, as many new exporters exit right away.
Eliminating the variance in iceberg costs, L = H = , yields the traditional sunk cost
model of Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007), studied in general equilibrium in Alessandria
and Choi (2011). We report the parameter estimates from this version of the model in the
column sunk-cost" in Table 2. In this case, the iceberg cost is estimated to be  =1.43, and
the export entry cost is estimated to be 3.8 times the cost of continuing to export. In this
model, the cost of starting an establishment is 1.5-percent higher than in the benchmark
model. In the sunk-cost model, an important reason that exporters stay in the market is
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to avoid paying the large up-front cost of re-entering. In the benchmark model, this e¤ect
is much smaller since the gap between the startup and continuation costs is small. Rather,
exporters stay in the market to maintain access to the good exporting technology, L, and
to avoid going through the growth process again.
To show how the timing of prots depends on the structure of trade costs, we take the
export decisions of the marginal new exporter in the benchmark model, which we considered
in 2C.7 We then assume that this new exporter faces the trade costs from the sunk-cost
model, but that it uses the same exit decisions as in the benchmark model. In this way, we
can see how the path of expected prots varies with the years exporting for a particular path
of productivity and participation. To make prots comparable across models, net prots
are measured relative to the export entry cost from the benchmark model. Figure 2C shows
that, with the sunk-cost export technology, the up-front investment to enter is about twice
as large, and the producer starts earning a net prot from the rst period in the market.
This partly reects a much higher initial export intensity and a smaller continuation cost
(about half that of our benchmark model). Over time, the prot rate does not change much.
Comparing the models, the sunk-cost model front-loads the costs and benets from exporting
relative to the benchmark model. The rising net prots in the benchmark model make it
clear that the continuation cost in that model is primarily an investment in lowering the
future marginal cost of exporting. Figure 2D reports the cumulative prots in both models.
It takes almost seven years for the cumulative net prots in the benchmark model to exceed
the net prots in the sunk-cost specication.
5 Results
We now consider the impact of a change in tari¤s on welfare and the dynamics of trade. In
particular, we assume an unanticipated elimination of the ten-percent tari¤. We focus on an
unanticipated change in tari¤s to clarify the aggregate e¤ect of tari¤s. It is straightforward
to consider the more empirically relevant case of anticipated changes in trade policy.
Table 2 reports the changes in welfare and trade. Figure 3 plots the dynamics of some key
7Obviously, this producer would make di¤erent exit decisions in this sunk-cost environment.
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variables. Even though trade grows gradually, consumption booms during the transition, so
the welfare gains are about 15 times larger than the change in steady-state consumption (6.30
vs 0.42). Thus, the conventional view that slow trade adjustment should lower the gains to
trade liberalization does not hold in the model with endogenous export participation and
exporter growth.
With lower tari¤s, trade expands substantially, rising from 9.7 percent of manufacturing
shipments to 29.2 percent. Figure 3A shows that this expansion takes time, as the trade
elasticity grows slowly. In the rst year, only the intensive margin operates, so the trade
elasticity is equal to  1:With time, as more exporters enter, continue, and mature, export
shipments expand. Ten years after the policy change, the endogenous part of the trade
elasticity8 has increased only by 69 percent of its long-run change: Trade is quite sluggish.
One way to measure the sluggishness in trade is to measure the discounted average trade
elasticity as
(42) "t = (1  )
1X
t=0
t"t:
This measure weights the early periods of trade adjustment more than later periods and
provides a relevant measure of the speed of trade adjustment. It also is a simple way to
compare trade dynamics across models. In our model, the short-run elasticity is four; the
discounted trade elasticity is 10.15; and the long-run elasticity is 11.55.
Sluggish trade growth does not lead to very sluggish growth in consumption or output
(see Figure 3B). Consumption and output jump initially. Consumption has a hump shape,
peaking seven years after the policy change and 9.75 percentage points above the long-run
change, which is a relatively moderate increase of 0.42 percentage point. Figure 3C shows
how di¤erent forms of investment change during the transition to the new steady-state.
Investment in capital initially falls and then recovers strongly as the economy uses capital
to smooth out the benets of the policy. Capital dynamics imply that output expands
a bit more strongly than consumption. Investment in establishment creation falls in the
rst few years and then recovers to a lower level of establishment creation. The stock of
8By the endogenous component, we mean the part due to entry and exit rather than to the intensive
margin.
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establishments falls gradually to the new steady-state.
The desire to reduce the number of establishments following the policy change is key
to the overshooting behavior in the model since it implies that more resources are initially
available for production along the transition (see Figure 3C) and that there is a large stock of
establishments that can be converted to exporting. The decline in establishments is gradual
because the overshooting in aggregate economic activity increases prots enough to o¤set the
negative e¤ect of increased trade on entry. This is a similar mechanism to that discussed by
Alessandria and Choi (2011) with only a sunk cost. Chaney (2005) and Burstein and Melitz
(2011) also argue for overshooting in consumption, but in their framework, with no dynamic
exporting decision or capital accumulation, the overshooting arises because of a sharp drop
in entry.
The e¤ect of the decline in establishment creation on the aggregate dynamics of the
economy can be seen most clearly in a counterfactual experiment in which the mass of
entrants does not change. For this experiment, it is assumed that the entry cost receives a
subsidy Et nanced by a lump-sum tax that keeps Nt = 1. Figure 4 plots the dynamics of
the trade elasticity and consumption in this counterfactual and the benchmark model. With
no change in establishment creation, trade expands by less, as exporters are discouraged
from entering in the face of greater local competition. Consumption declines slightly in
the rst period, owing to the investments in expanding export participation. It then grows
monotonically to the new steady-state level, which is seven percentage points above the level
in the benchmark model (7.41 vs 0.42). It takes 20 years for this alternative model to reach
the same level of consumption as in the benchmark model.
6 Sensitivity
To evaluate the role of producer-level export dynamics for the aggregate e¤ect of tari¤s,
we consider two variations of the benchmark economy. First, we eliminate the sluggishness
in producer-level export growth. This variation of the sunk-cost model of Das, Roberts,
and Tybout (2007) claries the role of the growth in exporter intensity on the aggregate
economy. Next, we examine how well a model without an export decision that is calibrated
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Table 2: E¤ect of a Cut in Tari¤s of 10 Percentage Points
Change Benchmark Sunk-Cost No-Cost- No-cost
No Sluggish
Welfare gain 6.30 4.75 3.34 2.34
Consumption 0.42 1.98 3.93 3.93
Discounted trade elasticity 10.15 6.90 11.55 10.15
Trade elasticity 11.55 7.19 11.55 11.55
Note: Welfare gain is a value of x that satises
P1
t=0 
tU (C 1ex) =
P1
t=0 
tU (Ct), where C 1 is the
consumption level in the initial steady state. The discounted trade elasticity is " = (1 )P1t=0 t"t, where
"t is the trade elasticity based on the di¤erence in trade between period t and the initial steady state. The
long-run trade elasticity is limt!1 "t.
to get the same aggregate export growth along the transition and in the new steady-state
approximates the results in our benchmark model. This allows us to explore how well the
idea from Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) that the gains from trade will
be identical across models that generate the same trade elasticity extends to a dynamic
environment.
6.1 No Exporter Growth (Sunk-Cost Model)
The slow export growth of producers is important for the welfare and trade response to a
change in trade barriers. To show this, we set L = H =  so that the intensity with which
a producer exports does not change over its time in the export market. This is a variation
of the model studied by Alessandria and Choi (2011). In terms of export intensity, new
exporters look just like old exporters in this model. This version of the model is recalibrated
to match similar features of exporting and trade. Table 1 summarizes the parameters, while
Table 2 summarizes the e¤ect of abstracting from export intensity dynamics on aggregate
outcomes. Figures 5 to 7 plot the transition to the new steady-state.
The sunk-cost model generates a smaller long-run expansion of trade than in the bench-
mark model. The trade elasticity is about 63 percent of the benchmark model (7.2 vs 11.5).
The trade transition, though, is relatively faster, as the discounted trade elasticity is about
68 percent of the benchmark models (6.9 vs 10.15). The sunk-cost model generates a larger
change in steady-state consumption than in our benchmark model (1.98 vs 0.42) but a smaller
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welfare gain (4.75 percent vs 6.30).
The benchmark model generates a larger welfare gain than the sunk-cost model because
overshooting is stronger even as trade grows more slowly. In terms of consumption, both
models generate similar dynamics in the rst two to three years. However, the sunk-cost
model peaks four years earlier and at a level below the benchmark model. The gap that
opens between the models closes only slowly. The more-delayed and larger dynamics of
consumption in the benchmark model reect the dynamics of new exporter growth. In the
benchmark model, more time and resources are used to build the stock of exporters initially,
so it takes longer to benet from this entry since exporters take time to become more e¢ cient.
The stronger long-run e¤ect on consumption in the sunk-cost model arises because there is
less substitution between trade and variety creation than in our benchmark model. Indeed,
in the long run, the stock of domestic producers falls by only 4.8 percent in the sunk-cost
model compared to 13.1 in the benchmark model.
6.2 No Export Decision (No-Cost Model)
To further explore how the micro details of exporting matter for aggregate welfare, we now
consider a version of the model in which all establishments export from birth (i.e., there are
no xed export costs, fH = fL = 0) with the same iceberg cost (i.e., L = H). This is
a variation of the Krugman (1980) model. Without some modication, the trade elasticity
is constant in this model. To generate a gradual increase in the trade elasticity, as in our
benchmark model, it is necessary to introduce an adjustment friction to either the nal
goods aggregator or the trade cost. We introduce an adjustment cost into the aggregation of
intermediates by nal goods producers.9 ;10 Specically, the aggregator is modied to include
9One can think of this specication as representing the challenges that rms face in adjusting their inputs
in the short run. This adjustment cost shares some similarities with that studied by Engel and Wang (2011).
10Alternatively, we could have generated slow trade growth by making the tari¤ fall gradually or allowing
the iceberg cost to depend on the change in the import share (i.e., t = e
 v lnt=t 1). Both of these
approaches yield similar ndings in that they reduce consumption along the transition, but the trade elasticity
would be constant in these cases.
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a time-varying weight on imported goods
Dt =
Z
z
ydH;t (z)
 1
 't (z) dz + gt
Z
z
ydF;t(z)
 1
 't (z) dz
 
 1
;(43)
gt = g
g
t 1

t
t 1
1 g
; g 1 = 1(44)
where t is the home intermediate goodsexpenditure share. With  > 0; the term gt implies
that an increase in the import share will lower the weight on imports in the aggregator.11
This demand shifter is assumed to depend on aggregate imports and is external to the nal
goods producer. It can be interpreted as a cost of adjusting inputs. It a¤ects only the
transition and not the steady-state.
The parameters of the nal goods aggregator,  and g, are set to minimize the gap
between the trade elasticity in the benchmark model and in this model, which is called the
No-cost model:
(45)

; g
	
= arg min
f;gg
( 1X
t=0

t ("Benchmark;t   "Nocost;t)
2)
:
This gives  = 1:89 and g = 0:25: Figure 5 plots the trade elasticity in the model with and
without the adjustment cost slowing down trade (No-cost No sluggish).
For the No-cost model to match the long-run trade elasticity in the benchmark model,
the elasticity of substitution, , is increased from 5 to 12.54. This lowers markups from 25
percent to about eight percent, which has the e¤ect of changing the labor share of income,
the ratio of gross-output to value added, and the ratio of trade to value added. To maintain
the same macro targets for the ratio of trade to shipments, labor share, and materials usage,
we must adjust x; ;and  accordingly. The capital share is roughly doubled from 14 percent
to 28 percent; the material usage is lowered from 80 percent to 70 percent; and the iceberg
cost is lowered to 1.11. The parameters are reported in Table 1. The column No-cost in
Table 2 summarizes the aggregate e¤ects of the cut in tari¤s considered in this alternative
model, and Figures 5 to 7 plot some aspects of the transition.
11The term gt can be thought of as a wedge that accounts for the changes in trade that cannot be
explained by relative prices. Recent work by Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010) and Alessandria, Kaboski,
and Midrigan (2013) show that there are substantial cyclical uctuations in this wedge.
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The key focus is on the change in welfare. The gains are almost four percentage points
larger in the benchmark model (6.3 vs 2.3), even though the steady-state change in con-
sumption is about 3.5 percentage points lower in the benchmark model (0.42 vs 3.93). This
large gap in welfare occurs because consumption in the benchmark model overshoots the
new steady-state, while in the No-cost model, consumption grows quite gradually. The gap
in consumption between the models is as large as 7.8 percentage points ve years after the
policy change. The gradual consumption growth in the No-cost model occurs because the
economy decumulates establishments only temporarily, with much smaller magnitudes, and
capital and trade grow gradually due to the adjustment cost in the use of inputs in the pro-
duction of nal goods.12 This suggests that focusing on the relationship between the trade
elasticity and welfare is not su¢ cient to estimate the gains from trade. Instead, one must
also consider how the scale of the economy is changing.
7 Conclusions
We develop a model consistent with the evidence that trade is sluggish at the producer and
aggregate levels. In our theory, it takes time and resources to lower the marginal cost of
exporting. This implies that the distribution of iceberg costs is endogenous and reects the
investment decisions of producers. We estimate the e¤ect of a cut in tari¤s on trade and the
gains from trade in a general equilibrium variation of our theory. Surprisingly, although we
nd that trade grows sluggishly, we also nd that the benets of a cut in tari¤s are more
immediate. Including these transition periods increases by more than 15 times the welfare
gains from a change in trade policy relative to the change in steady-state allocations. Models
without this dynamic export decision underestimate the gains from removing trade barriers,
particularly when constrained to also match the sluggishness in trade expansion.
We develop a model of producer-level export growth in which the technology for exporting
is endogenous. This is a more general version of the standard xed-variable cost trade-o¤
emphasized in the literature. We nd that the estimated technology for exporting is risky
12Eliminating the adjustment cost in inputs would speed up the transition and increase the welfare gains
in the No-Cost model to 3.5 percent. However, the path of aggregate dynamics would remain quite di¤erent
from that in our benchmark model.
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and that time in the export market is important to becoming a successful exporter. New
exporters are willing to incur substantial losses for a number of years as they build their
foreign sales. This suggests smaller up-front costs and larger continuation costs compared to
those found in other studies; it also suggests that the benets from entering the export market
accrue more gradually. Other sources of producer-level export growth, such as building
distribution networks or brand recognition, are likely to also be important. However, we
suspect that these alternative explanations for sluggishness will generate similar micro and
macro dynamics since they also increase the costs of entry and push the prots from exporting
into the future, making exporters reluctant to exit the export market.
Finally, in our analysis, the gap between the short-run and long-run aggregate trade
elasticity is disciplined by evidence on producer-level export dynamics. The dynamics of the
aggregate trade elasticity following a trade reform are also likely to depend on general equi-
librium considerations of the infrastructure for trade, such as customs, ports, pipelines, and
railroads, which must be expanded to accommodate the increased ow of goods. Accumulat-
ing these forms of trade-specic physical capital, as opposed to the producer-specic exporter
capital emphasized here, is likely to generate familiar neoclassical transition dynamics.
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Figure 1A: Export Intensity of Colombian Exporters
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Figure 1B: Colombian Exporter Continuation Rate
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Figure 2: Exporter Dynamics in Stationary Steady State
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Figure 3: Benchmark Model Elimination of 10 Percent Tari¤
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Figure 4: Role of Entry Adjustment on Trade and Consumption
A. Trade Elasticity
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Figure 5: Comparison of Trade Dynamics
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Figure 6: Comparison of Consumption, Wage, and Output Dynamics
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Figure 7: Comparison of Investment, Entry, and Labor Dynamics
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A Analytical Solutions to a Model with New-Exporter Dynamics
In this appendix, we analytically examine the role of exporter dynamics for the long-run distortions from
tariffs. We show that with new-exporter dynamics that the following are true:
1. The trade elasticity is higher.
2. The steady-state change in consumption is smaller for a given trade growth.
3. The stock of establishments increases with tariffs, and more so as we increase the discount factor and
disadvantage of new exporters.
To make these points most clearly, we keep the main elements related to new-exporter dynamics and
eliminate other elements. Specifically, as in the benchmark model, new exporters have a disadvantage in
that they face a relatively high marginal trade cost ξH > ξL when they start exporting. We eliminate capital
accumulation, input-output structure, and general transition probability for iceberg costs. Notes with these
extensions are available from the authors.
We make the following modification to the benchmark model to obtain the analytical solutions. First,
in each period, producers draw their elasticity-adjusted productivity a = e(θ−1)z from a Pareto distribution
with a > 1, and the slope parameter of η > 1.1 The pdf of the distribution is given by φ (a) = ηa−(η+1).
Second, the exogenous shutdown probability is constant with nd = 1 − ns. Third, producers face the fixed
costs in exporting fX = fL = fH measured in labor units. See Alessandria and Choi (2011) for results when
there is a sunk export cost (fH ≥ fL). The payment should be made when they export. Fourth, there are
fixed costs in production fP measured in labor units. If a producer does not pay the fixed cost in production,
it becomes dormant in the current period. For notational simplicity, we replace 1 + ξ with ξ, and 1 + τ with
τ. To obtain clear-cut solutions, we assume that the tariff rate is also an iceberg cost. As in the benchmark
model, we assume that ρ = ρξ (ξH |ξH) = ρξ (ξL|ξL) > 1/2.2 For notational convenience, we focus on the
∗Corresponding author: george.alessandria@gmail.com, Ten Independence Mall, Philadelphia, PA 19106.
1With the elasticity-adjusted productivity a, the relative size of a producer is proportional to a.
2We assume that ρξ (ξL|ξL) > ρξ (ξL|ξH) by setting ρ > 1/2.
symmetric steady state. We will skip the agent’s problems, as they are identical to those in the benchmark
model.
A.1 Consumers
The first-order conditions from the consumer’s problem in the steady state give the budget constraint,
(1) C = WL+ Π + T.
A.2 Final Good Producers
The final good producers’ problem yields the demand for goods,
ydH (a, ξ) = [PH,t (a, ξ)]
−θ
C,(2)
ydF (a, ξ) = [PF (a, ξ)]
−θ
C,(3)
and the normalized final good’s price index, P = 1,
(4) 1 =
∑
ξ∈{ξL,ξH ,∞}
∫ [
PH,t (a, ξ)
1−θ
ϕH,t (a, ξ) + [PF,t (a, ξ)]
1−θϕF,t (a, ξ)
]
da.
Note that we replace the productivity z with its level a.
A.3 Intermediate Good Producers
The first-order conditions give the pricing rule
PH (a, ξ) =
(
θW
θ − 1
)
a
1
1−θ(5)
P ∗H (a, ξ) = τξ
(
θW
θ − 1
)
a
1
1−θ ,(6)
and the demands for inputs
(7) l (z, ξ) = a
1
1−θ y (a, ξ) .
The total output of a producer with (a, ξ) is given by
(8) y (a, ξ) = ydH (a, ξ) + τξy
∗d
H (a, ξ) =
(
θW
θ − 1
)−θ (
1 + τ1−θξ1−θ
)
a
θ
θ−1C.
Using (8), we can rewrite the demands for inputs as
(9) l (a, ξ) =
(
1 + τ1−θξ1−θ
)( θW
θ − 1
)−θ
aC.
The operating profit of a producer with (a, ξ) is given by
Π (a, ξ) = PH (a, ξ) yH (a, ξ) + P
∗
H (a, ξ) y
∗d
H (a, ξ)−Wl (a, ξ)(10)
= PH (a, ξ) y (a, ξ)−
(
θ − 1
θ
)(
1 + τ1−θξ1−θ
)( θW
θ − 1
)1−θ
aC
=
(
1
θ
)(
1 + τ1−θξ1−θ
)( θW
θ − 1
)1−θ
aC.
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Marginal Productivity: Let Π0 =
(
1
θ
) (
θW
θ−1
)1−θ
C, the operating profit of a non-exporter with a =
1.The marginal active producer’s productivity aP satisfies
(11) WfP = Π (aP ,∞) = Π0aP .
Here, we assume that fP is sufficiently high so that aP > 1, and fX is relatively high so that the marginal
active producer with aP does not export. The value of an active producer with (a, ξ) is given by
(12) v (a, ξ) = Π0
(
1 + τ1−θξ1−θ
)
a−WfP −Wf + nsβEV (ξ) ,
where EV (ξ) is the expected value of the producer with ξ last period, and f is the optimal choice of the
producer with ξ. Specifically,
EV (∞) =
∫ aH
1
v (a,∞)φ (a) da+
∫ ∞
aH
v (a, ξH)φ (a) da,(13)
EV (ξH) = ρ
[∫ aH
1
v (a,∞)φ (a) da+
∫ ∞
aH
v (a, ξH)φ (a) da
]
(14)
+ (1− ρ)
[∫ aL
1
v (a,∞)φ (a) da+
∫ ∞
aL
v (a, ξL)φ (a) da
]
,
EV (ξL) = (1− ρ)
[∫ aH
1
v (a,∞)φ (a) da+
∫ ∞
aH
v (a, ξH)φ (a) da
]
(15)
+ρ
[∫ aL
1
v (a,∞)φ (a) da+
∫ ∞
aL
v (a, ξL)φ (a) da
]
,
where the marginal exporters’ productivity aH and aL satisfy
v (aH , ξH) = v (aH ,∞) ,(16)
v (aL, ξL) = v (aL,∞) .(17)
Using (12), we can rewrite the conditions as
WfX = Π0τ
1−θξ1−θH aH + nsβ [EV (ξH)− EV (∞)] ,(18)
WfX = Π0τ
1−θξ1−θL aL + nsβ [EV (ξL)− EV (∞)] .(19)
Let
Ψj =
∫ ∞
aj
aφ (a) da =
(
η
η − 1
)
a1−ηj ,(20)
nj =
∫ ∞
aj
φ (a) da = a−ηj ,(21)
where j ∈ {P,H,L} . Then, we can rewrite the expected value of a non-exporter as
EV (∞) = Π0
(
ΨP + τ
1−θξ1−θH ΨH
)− nPWfP − nHWfX(22)
+nsβ [nHEV (ξH) + (1− nH)EV (∞)]
=
(
Π0
η
)(
ΨP + τ
1−θξ1−θH ΨH
)
+ nsβEV (∞)
=
(
1
1− nsβ
)(
Π0
η
)(
ΨP + τ
1−θξ1−θH ΨH
)
.
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The entry condition is given by
WfE = βEV (∞)(23)
=
(
β
1− nsβ
)(
Π0
η
)(
ΨP + τ
1−θξ1−θH ΨH
)
.
The expected values of an exporter with ξ = ξH can be rewritten as
EV (ξH) = Π0
[
ΨP + ρτ
1−θξ1−θH ΨH + (1− ρ) τ1−θξ1−θL ΨL
]
(24)
−nPWfP − [ρnH + (1− ρ)nL]WfX
+nsβρ [nHEV (ξH) + (1− nH)EV (∞)]
+nsβ (1− ρ) [nLEV (ξL) + (1− nL)EV (∞)]
=
(
Π0
η
)[
ΨP + ρτ
1−θξ1−θH ΨH + (1− ρ) τ1−θξ1−θL ΨL
]
+ nsβEV (∞) .
Similarly, the expected values of an exporter with ξ = ξL can be rewritten as
(25) EV (ξL) =
(
Π0
η
)[
ΨP + (1− ρ) τ1−θξ1−θH ΨH + ρτ1−θξ1−θL ΨL
]
+ nsβEV (∞) .
From (22), (24) and (25), we have
EV (ξH)− EV (∞) =
(
Π0
η
)
(1− ρ) τ1−θ (ξ1−θL ΨL − ξ1−θH ΨH) ,(26)
EV (ξL)− EV (∞) =
(
Π0
η
)
ρτ1−θ
(
ξ1−θL ΨL − ξ1−θH ΨH
)
.(27)
From (18), (19), (26) and (27), we have the marginal exporters’ productivity conditions as
WfX = Π0τ
1−θξ1−θH aH +
(
nsβ
η
)
Π0 (1− ρ) τ1−θ
(
ξ1−θL ΨL − ξ1−θH ΨH
)
,(28)
WfX = Π0τ
1−θξ1−θL aL +
(
nsβ
η
)
Π0ρτ
1−θ (ξ1−θL ΨL − ξ1−θH ΨH) .(29)
The masses of non-exporters, N0, exporters with ξH , NH , and exporters with ξL, NL, are given by
N0 = [(nsN0 +NE) + ρnsNH + (1− ρ)nsNL] (1− nH)(30)
+ [(1− ρ)nsNH + ρnsNL] (1− nL) ,
NH = [(nsN0 +NE) + ρnsNH + (1− ρ)nsNL]nH ,(31)
NL = [(1− ρ)nsNH + ρnsNL]nL,(32)
N = N0 +NH +NL,(33)
where N is the mass of all producers, and NE is the mass of entrants, NE = (1− ns)N . Using the masses
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of producers, we can rewrite (4) with (5) and (6) as,
1 =
(
θW
θ − 1
)1−θ
N
(
ΨP + τ
1−θΨX
)
(34)
ΨX = ξ
1−θ
H
[(
nsN0 +NE
N
)
+ ρns
(
NH
N
)
+ (1− ρ)ns
(
NL
N
)]
ΨH(35)
+ξ1−θL
[
(1− ρ)ns
(
NH
N
)
+ ρns
(
NL
N
)]
ΨL
= ξ1−θH ΨH
(
NH
NnH
)
+ ξ1−θL ΨL
(
NL
NnL
)
= ξ1−θH ΨH +
(
ξ1−θL ΨL − ξ1−θH ΨH
)( NL
NnL
)
Labor Market Clearing Condition: The total labor in production is given by
LP =
∑
ξ∈{ξL,ξH ,∞}
∫
l (z, ξ, f)ϕH,t (a, ξ) da = (θ − 1)
(
Π0
W
)
N
(
ΨP + τ
1−θΨX
)
.
The total labor used for fixed costs in production is given by
(36) NnP fT =
Π0
W
(
η − 1
η
)
NΨP .
The total fixed cost in exporting is given by
LX = [nsN0 +NE + ρnsNH + (1− ρ)nsNL]nHfX + [(1− ρ)nsNH + ρnsNL]nLfX(37)
=
Π0
W
(
NH
nH
)(
η − 1
η
)
τ1−θξ1−θH ΨH
+
Π0
W
(
NH
nH
)(
nsβ
η
)
(1− ρ) τ1−θnH
(
ξ1−θL ΨL − ξ1−θH ΨH
)
+
Π0
W
(
NL
nL
)(
η − 1
η
)
τ1−θξ1−θΨL
+
Π0
W
(
NL
nL
)(
nsβ
η
)
ρτ1−θnL
(
ξ1−θL ΨL − ξ1−θH ΨH
)
=
Π0
W
τ1−θN
[(
η − 1
η
)
ΨX +
(
β
η
)(
ΨX − ξ1−θH ΨH
)]
The total labor used for entry is given by
(38) NEfE =
β (1− ns)
1− nsβ
(
1
η
)(
Π0
W
)
N
(
ΨP + τ
1−θξ1−θH ΨH
)
The labor market clearing condition is given by
L = (θ − 1) Π0
W
N
(
ΨP + τ
1−θΨX
)
+
Π0
W
(
η − 1
η
)
NΨP(39)
+
Π0
W
τ1−θN
[(
η − 1
η
)
ΨX +
(
β
η
)(
ΨX − ξ1−θH ΨH
)]
+
β (1− ns)
1− nsβ
(
1
η
)(
Π0
W
)
N
(
ΨP + τ
1−θξ1−θH ΨH
)
.
Rearranging it, we have
(40)
WL
C
= 1− 1− β
θη
− nsβ (1− β)
(1− nsβ) θηS0,
5
where
(41) S0 =
ΨP + τ
1−θξ1−θH ΨH
ΨP + τ1−θΨX
.
Note that S−10 can be interpreted as a measure of an entrant’s disadvantage. Clearly, S0 = 1 if ξH = ξL,
and S0 < 1, if ξH > ξL.
Aggregates: The expenditure on imported goods relative to that on home goods is given by
(42) IMD =
∑
ξ∈{ξL,ξH}
∫
a
PF (a, ξ) yF (a, ξ)ϕF (a, ξ) da∑
ξ∈{ξL,ξH ,∞}
∫
a
PH (a, ξ) yH (a, ξ)ϕH (a, ξ) da
=
τ1−θΨX
ΨP
.
The share of expenditures on domestic goods is given by
(43) λ =
1
1 + IMD
=
ΨP
ΨP + τ1−θΨX
.
A.4 Long-Run Growths
Productivity Thresholds, aP , aH , and aL: The productivity thresholds are determined by four equa-
tions (11), (23), (28) and (29). With these four equations, we have three equations that determine the
productivity thresholds(
fE
fP
)
aP =
(
β
1− nsβ
)(
1
η
)(
ΨP + τ
1−θξ1−θH ΨH
)
,(44) (
fX
fP
)
aP = τ
1−θξ1−θH aH +
(
nsβ
η
)
(1− ρ) τ1−θ (ξ1−θL ΨL − ξ1−θH ΨH) ,(45) (
fX
fP
)
aP = τ
1−θξ1−θL aL +
(
nsβ
η
)
ρτ1−θ
(
ξ1−θL ΨL − ξ1−θH ΨH
)
.(46)
From (45) and (46), we have
(47) ξ1−θH aH − ξ1−θL aL =
(
nsβ
η
)
(2ρ− 1) (ξ1−θL ΨL − ξ1−θH ΨH) .
Note that we should have ξ1−θL ΨL > ξ
1−θ
H ΨH by construction. Thus, we have
(48) ξ1−θH aH > ξ
1−θ
L aL,
and aH > aL with ξH > ξL. It follows that ΨH < ΨL and nH < nL. Taking the log-linearization of (47), we
have
(49) âL =
(
ξH
ξL
)1−θ (
aH
aL
)[
1− nsβ (2ρ− 1)nH
1− nsβ (2ρ− 1)nL
]
âH .
Since ξ1−θH aH > ξ
1−θ
L aL and nH < nL, we have âL/âH > 1. Taking the log-linearization of (44) and (45), we
have
âP = − τ
1−θξ1−θH ΨH
ηΨP + τ1−θξ1−θH ΨH
[(θ − 1) τ̂ + (η − 1) âH ] ,(50)
âP = − (θ − 1) τ̂ +
(
fP
fX
)
τ1−θa−1P
[
ξ1−θH aH âH(51)
−
(
nsβ
η
)
(1− ρ) (η − 1) (ξ1−θL ΨLâL − ξ1−θH ΨH âH)] .
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Rearranging them with (49), we have
âH =
(θ − 1) ηΨP
(η − 1) τ1−θξ1−θH ΨH +
[
ηΨP + τ1−θξ1−θH ΨH
] (
ζ0
ζ1
) τ̂ ,(52)
âP = − (θ − 1) [ζ0 + (η − 1) ζ1] τ
1−θξ1−θH ΨH
ηζ0ΨP + [ζ0 + (η − 1) ζ1] τ1−θξ1−θH ΨH
τ̂ ,(53)
where
ζ0 = 1− nsβ (1− ρ) (nL − nH)
1− nsβ (2ρ− 1)nL ,(54)
ζ1 =
(
fX
fP
)
τθ−1ξθ−1H
(
aP
aH
)
(55)
= 1 + nsβ (1− ρ)nH
(
1
η − 1
)[(
ξL
ξH
)1−θ (
ΨL
ΨH
)
− 1
]
.
Note that ζ1 > 1 and 0 < ζ0 < 1 since
(56) ζ0 =
1− nsβρnL + nsβ (1− ρ)nH
1− nsβ (2ρ− 1)nL > 0.
Clearly, âH/τ̂ > 0, and âP /τ̂ < 0. From (49), we also have âL/τ̂ > 0. That is, with a tariff cut, τ̂ < 0, the
exporting thresholds aH and aL both fall, but the production threshold aP rises.
From (53), we find that following a cut in the tariff rate, aP falls at the margin less in the model with
exporter dynamics than in the model without them, for the same initial trade share and tariff rate. To see
that, we can rewrite (53) as
(57)
âP
τ̂
= − (θ − 1)
1 + ( ΨP
τ1−θΨX
) ηΨX
ξ1−θH ΨH
1 + (η − 1)
(
ζ1
ζ0
)
−1 .
From (43), we have
(58)
ΨP
τ1−θΨX
=
(
λ
1− λ
)
.
From (35), we have
(59)
ΨX
ξ1−θH ΨH
= 1 +
(
NL
NnL
)[(
ξL
ξH
)1−θ (
ΨL
ΨH
)
− 1
]
.
From (30), (31) and (32), we have the fraction of exporters with ξH and ξL as(
NL
NnL
)
+
(
NH
NnH
)
= 1,(60)
(1− ρnsnL)
(
NL
N
)
= (1− ρ)ns
(
NH
N
)
nL,(61)
Rearranging them, we have the fraction of producers with ξL as
(62)
NL
NnL
=
(1− ρ)nsnH
1 + (1− ρ)nsnH − ρnsnL .
So, we have
(63)
ηΨX
ξ1−θH ΨH
= η +
η (1− ρ)nsnH
1 + (1− ρ)nsnH − ρnsnL
[(
ξL
ξH
)1−θ (
ΨL
ΨH
)
− 1
]
.
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From (54) and (55), we have
1 + (η − 1) ζ1
ζ0
= 1 +
1− nsβ (2ρ− 1)nL
1 + nsβ (1− ρ)nH − nsβρnL(64) {
η − 1 + nsβ (1− ρ)nH
[(
ξL
ξH
)1−θ (
ΨL
ΨH
)
− 1
]}
= η +
nsβ (1− ρ)nH
1 + nsβ (1− ρ)nH − nsβρnL
[(
ξL
ξH
)1−θ (
ΨL
ΨH
)
− 1
]

(η − 1)
(
nL
nH
− 1
)
(
ξL
ξH
)1−θ (
ΨL
ΨH
)
− 1
+ [1− nsβ (2ρ− 1)nL]
 .
From (47), we have
(65) 1−
(
ξL
ξH
)1−θ (
ΨL
ΨH
)(
nH
nL
)
= nsβ (2ρ− 1)
(
1
η − 1
)
nH
[(
ξL
ξH
)1−θ (
ΨL
ΨH
)
− 1
]
.
Rearranging it, we have
(66) nsβ (2ρ− 1)nL =
(η − 1)
(
nL
nH
− 1
)
(
ξL
ξH
)1−θ (
ΨL
ΨH
)
− 1
− (η − 1) .
Applying this to (64), we have
1 + (η − 1) ζ1
ζ0
= η +
ηnsβ (1− ρ)nH
1 + nsβ (1− ρ)nH − nsβρnL
[(
ξL
ξH
)1−θ (
ΨL
ΨH
)
− 1
]
.
We have
1 + nsβ (1− ρ)nH − nsβρnL = 1 + ns (1− ρ)nH − nsρnL + (1− β)ns [ρnL − (1− ρ)nH ](67)
≥ 1 + ns (1− ρ)nH − nsρnL,
since ρ > 1/2 and nL > nH . This gives
(68)
nsβ (1− ρ)nH
1 + nsβ (1− ρ)nH − nsβρnL <
ns (1− ρ)nH
1 + ns (1− ρ)nH − nsρnL .
Thus, we have
(69) − âP
(θ − 1) τ̂ |ξH>ξL < −
âP
(θ − 1) τ̂ |ξH=ξL ,
Exporters with ξL : From (62) we have the fraction of producers with ξL as
(70)
NL
NnL
=
[
1 +
1− ρnsnL
(1− ρ)nsnH
]−1
.
Since âH/τ̂ > 0, and âL/τ̂ > 0, we have n̂H/τ̂ < 0, and n̂L/τ̂ < 0. Thus, from (70), the fraction of producers
with ξL falls with a rise in the tariff rate,
(71)
̂( NL
NnL
)
τ̂
< 0, and
̂(NL
N
)
τ̂
< 0.
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The Trade Elasticity: Log-linearizing (35) gives
(72) Ψ̂X = Ψ̂H +
(
1− ξ
1−θ
H ΨH
ΨX
)
̂( NL
NnL
)
+

(
ξL
ξH
)1−θ (
ΨL
ΨH
)
(
ξL
ξH
)1−θ (
ΨL
ΨH
)
− 1
(Ψ̂L − Ψ̂H)
 .
We have
Ψ̂H
τ̂
= − (η − 1) âH
τ̂
< 0,(73) ̂( NL
NnL
)
τ̂
< 0,(74)
Ψ̂L − Ψ̂H
τ̂
= − (η − 1) (âL − âH)
τ̂
(75)
= − (η − 1)
{(
ξH
ξL
)1−θ (
aH
aL
)[
1− nsβ (2ρ− 1)nH
1− nsβ (2ρ− 1)nL
]
− 1
}
âH
τ̂
< 0.
Thus, we have Ψ̂Xτ̂ <
Ψ̂H
τ̂ < 0. From (51), we have
(76) âP = − (θ − 1) τ̂ +
(
ζ0
ζ1
)
âH .
Using (72) and (76), the trade elasticity ε is given by
ε =
̂( ΨP
τ1−θΨX
)
τ̂
(77)
= η (θ − 1) + (η − 1)
(
1− ζ0
ζ1
)
âH
τ̂
−
(
1− ξ
1−θ
H ΨH
ΨX
)
̂( NL
NnL
)
τ̂
+

(
ξL
ξH
)1−θ (
ΨL
ΨH
)
(
ξL
ξH
)1−θ (
ΨL
ΨH
)
− 1
( Ψ̂L − Ψ̂H
τ̂
) .
Since 0 < ζ0 < 1, ζ1 > 1,
âH
τ̂ > 0,
̂( NL
NnL
)
τ̂ < 0, and
(
Ψ̂L−Ψ̂H
τ̂
)
≤ 0, we have ε > η (θ − 1) . Note that when
ξH = ξL, the elasticity becomes ε|ξH=ξL = η (θ − 1) . Thus, the model with exporter dynamics has a greater
trade elasticity compared to the model without it, ξH = ξL.
Entrant’s disadvantage (S−10 ): The entrant’s disadvantage is measured with S
−1
0 in (41). Log-linearizing
the equation gives
Ŝ0 =
ΨP Ψ̂P + τ
1−θξ1−θH ΨH
(
− (θ − 1) τ̂ + Ψ̂H
)
ΨP + τ1−θξ1−θH ΨH
−
ΨP Ψ̂P + τ
1−θΨX
(
− (θ − 1) τ̂ + Ψ̂X
)
ΨP + τ1−θΨX
(78)
=
(
ΨP + τ
1−θξ1−θH ΨH
)−1 (
ΨP + τ
1−θΨX
)−1{
τ1−θ
(
ΨX − ξ1−θH ΨH
)
ΨP Ψ̂P + τ
1−θ [ΨX − ξ1−θH ΨH]ΨP (θ − 1) τ̂
−τ1−θΨXΨ̂X
[
ΨP
(
1− ξ
1−θ
H ΨH
ΨX
Ψ̂H
Ψ̂X
)
+ τ1−θξ1−θH ΨH
(
1− Ψ̂H
Ψ̂X
)]}
.
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Since Ψ̂P /τ̂ > 0, Ψ̂X/τ̂ < 0, and 0 < Ψ̂H/Ψ̂X < 1, we have Ŝ0/τ̂ > 0. That is, the entrant’s disadvantage,
S−10 , rises with a tariff cut.
Labor Share of GDP (WL/C) : From the labor market clearing condition (40), we have
(79)
WL
C
= b0 − b1S0,
where b0 = 1−
(
1−β
θη
)
> 0, and b1 =
nsβ(1−β)
(1−nsβ)ηθ . Note that b1 > 0 if β ∈ (0, 1) and b1 = 0 if β = 1. Thus the
trade liberalization, τ = 1 from τ > 1, raises the labor share of GDP, WL/C, with a rise in the entrant’s
disadvantage, S−10 .
Investment on Establishment Capital (N): From the entry condition (23) and the price index (34),
we have
WfE =
(
β
1− nsβ
)(
1
ηθ
)
C
N
(
ΨP + τ
1−θξ1−θH ΨH
ΨP + τ1−θΨX
)
(80)
=
(
β
1− nsβ
)(
1
ηθ
)
CS0
N
.
Using (79), we have
(81) N =
(
β
1− nsβ
)(
1
ηθ
)(
L
fE
)(
S0
b0 − b1S0
)
.
Since S0 falls with the trade liberalization, the mass of producers, N , falls, N̂/τ̂ > 0.
Wage Rate (W ): From the price index (34), we have
(82) W θ−1 ∝ N (ΨP + τ1−θΨX) ,
where ∝ denotes ‘proportional to’. From the entry condition (23) and the marginal producer condition (11),
we have
(83) aP ∝ ΨP + τ1−θξ1−θH ΨH .
We can rewrite it as
(84) ΨP ∝
(
ΨP + τ
1−θξ1−θH ΨH
)−(η−1)
.
So, we have
ΨP
ΨP + τ−θξ1−θH ΨH
=
λ
S0
(85)
∝ (ΨP + τ1−θξ1−θH ΨH)−η .
This gives
ΨP + τ
1−θΨX = λ−1ΨP(86)
∝ (S0)−
η−1
η λ−
1
η .
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With (81) and (86), (82) can be rewritten as
(87) W θ−1 ∝ (b0 − b1S0)−1
(
S0
λ
) 1
η
,
or
(88) W ∝ (b0 − b1S0)−
1
θ−1
(
S0
λ
) 1
η(θ−1)
.
So, following the trade liberalization, an increase in the entrant’s disadvantage, S−10 lowers the wage growth.
Having positive discount rate, β < 1 and b1 > 0, further reduces the growth of the wage rate.
Consumption (C): Using (79) and (88), consumption can be rewritten as
C ∝
(
C
W
)
W(89)
∝
[
S
b0 − b1S0
]
(b0 − b1S0)−
1
θ−1
(
S0
λ
) 1
η(θ−1)
∝ (b0 − b1S0)−
θ
θ−1
(
S0
λ
) 1
η(θ−1)
Following the trade liberalization, a fall in the share of expenditures on domestic goods λ raises the welfare.
However, the increase in the entrant’s disadvantage, S−10 reduces the welfare gains. If the discount rate
is positive, β < 1 and b1 > 0, the welfare gains are further reduced because a fall in S0 lowers the gains
additionally through a fall in the mass of producers.
Long-run Welfare Gains with Same Trade Growth: Equation (89) shows the relationship between
the trade growth, λ−1, and the long run welfare gains, and how the entrant’s disadvantage S−10 affect the
long run consumption growth. However, it is not clear how the model predicts the long run growth once the
model is calibrated to match the trade growth with same tariffs τ and initial trades. To find it out we can
rewrite the consumption equation as follows. From (79), (82) and (83) we have
C ∝
(
C
W
)(
NaP
S0
) 1
θ−1
(90)
∝
(
1
b0 − b1S0
)[
(b0 − b1S0)−1 aP
] 1
θ−1
∝ (b0 − b1S0)−
θ
θ−1 a
1
θ−1
P .
Note that − âP(θ−1)τ̂ |ξH>ξL < − âP(θ−1)τ̂ |ξH=ξL with the same trade shares λ, and S0 falls with a tariff cut. Thus,
we have
(91) − Ĉ
τ̂
∣∣∣∣∣
ξH>ξL
< − Ĉ
τ̂
∣∣∣∣∣
ξH=ξL
.
Thus, with a trade liberalization, the long run welfare gains are smaller with exporter dynamics relative to
those without under the same trade growth. The key reason for the result is that with the exporter dynamics,
there exists a entrant’s disadvantage, S−10 . When the disadvantage rises with the trade liberalization, the
investment on the establishment capital, N, falls. This reduces the welfare gains. Additionally, with a fall
in the mass of producers, the adjustment of the production threshold aP becomes smaller compared to the
case without a change in N (with ξH = ξL). This smaller adjustment of aP reduces the long run welfare
11
gains.
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